

## Message Text

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ACTION EA-13

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 IO-03 NSC-07 NSCE-00 CIAE-00

INR-11 NSAE-00 RSC-01 L-02 PRS-01 PM-03 SP-02 DODE-00

SSO-00 INRE-00 DRC-01 /059 W  
----- 117399

O 121014Z SEP 74

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5874

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO NIACT IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 6047

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, KS, JA

SUBJECT: DETERIORATION IN ROK-JAPAN RELATIONS

REF: A. STATE 198225

B. STATE 199964

C. SEOUL 6014

D. TOKYO 11828

1. CHARGE SAW PRIMIN KIM CHONG-PIL AFTERNOON SEPT 12 AND CAREFULLY REVIEWED INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REFS (A) AND (B). SINCE WHAT APPEARED TO BE LARGEST DEMONSTRATION YET WAS THEN IN PROCESS OUTSIDE JAPANESE EMBASSY, CHARGE STRONGLY URGED THAT ROKG DO ALL IN ITS POWER TO CALM PUBLIC FEELINGS, PREVENT VIOLENCE AND FORESTALL ANY INCIDENT WHICH MIGHT ESCALATE DANGERS. IN RESPONSE LATTER POINT, PRIMIN SAID HE HAD ISSUED ALL NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS.

2. WITH RESPECT MAIN POINTS OF CHARGE'S PRESENTATION, PRIMIN SAID HE AGREED THAT PROBLEM HAD NARROWED DOWN CONSIDERABLY. IT IS NOW QUESTION OF LANGUAGE OF JAPANESE LETTER WITH RESPECT THREE POINTS WHICH, AS DRAFTED, ROKG  
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CANNOT ACCEPT. HE SPOKE AT LENGTH OF IMPRECISION OF

JAPANESE LANGUAGE WHICH PERMITS WIDELY VARYING INTERPRETATION. HE ALSO SUSPICIOUS OF JAPANESE INTENT IN OFFERING VAGUE TERMINOLOGY ON POINTS IN QUESTION, SUGGESTING THAT IN AFTERMATH JAPANESE WOULD USE VAGUE LANGUAGE AS BASIS FOR DENYING THEY WILLING MEET KOREAN POSITION. IN SHORT, KOREANS REQUIRED AT LEAST GREATER DEGREE OF PRECISION.

3. PRIMIN THEN TOOK HANDWRITTEN COPY OF JAPANESE TEXT FROM HIS POCKET AND RAPIDLY MADE INSERTIONS AT CRITICAL POINTS. THESE, HE SAID, MIGHT POSSIBLY STRENGTHEN JAPANESE LETTER SUFFICIENTLY TO PERMIT HIM PERSUADE PRES PARK TO ACCEPT IT. (FOLLOWING COMMENTS REFER TO TEXT PROVIDED REF D):

A. FIRST POINT AT ISSUE WAS JAPANESE ACCEPTANCE OF SOME DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY. SECOND CLAUSE OF FIRST SENTENCE, SECOND PARAGRAPH SHOULD SAY SOMETHING TO EFFECT THAT IN CONSIDERATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE INVOLVING JAPAN, JAPANESE GOVT HAS RESPONSIBILITY OR FEELS RESPONSIBLE.

B. LAST CLAUSE OF FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA THREE SHOULD STATE THAT GOJ WILL PROSECUTE THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PERTINENT LAWS. HE SAID JAPANESE MAY LATER ARGUE THAT THERE ARE NO PERTINENT LAWS; IF THIS IS ACTUALLY CASE, KOREANS WOULD NOT OBJECT, BUT JAPANESE SHOULD AT LEAST ALLOW POSSIBILITY OF PROSECUTION.

C. FINAL SENTENCE OF THIS PARA, WHICH COVERS IMPORTANT POINT INVOLVING CHOSEN SOREN, MUST BE STRENGTHENED BY INSERTION OF LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD EXPRESS INTENTION TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY ACTIONS TO CONTROL TERRORIST ACTS AIMED AT OVERTHROW OF ROK GOVT.

4. PRIMIN SAID THAT PRESIDENT WOULD CHAIR MEETING AT 4:30 THIS AFTERNOON TO DETERMINE NEXT ROKG MOVE. PRIMIN SAID HE WANTED TO PERSUADE PRESIDENT TO DELAY ANY HASTY DECISION. IF CHANGES HE SUGGESTED COULD BE PRESENTED TO PRESIDENT AS HAVING US SUPPORT, HE FELT CERTAIN PRESIDENT COULD BE CONFIDENTIAL

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PERSUADED. HE ALSO SOUGHT IN OTHER WAYS TO PERSUADE CHARGE TO INDICATE APPROVAL OF SUGGESTED LANGUAGE. CHARGE STATED FIRMLY THAT NEITHER HE NOR USG COULD BE PUT IN THAT POSITION. FOR HIS PART, PRIMIN STRESSED TO CHARGE THAT FACT PRIMIN WOULD EVEN SUGGEST THE ABOVE CHANGES SHOULD NOT BE REVEALED TO EITHER OTHER KOREANS OR JAPANESE, SINCE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT TOLERATE SUCH AN ACTION IF HE KNEW.

5. PRIMIN SAID HE MOST ANXIOUS TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH JAPANESE BUT THAT HE COULD NOT MAKE NEW PROPOSAL WITHOUT PRESIDENT'S PERMISSION AND COULD NOT PERSUADE PRESIDENT WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF USG BACKING. HE ASKED WHETHER CHARGE THOUGHT WASHINGTON WOULD BE WILLING TO CALL IN JAPANESE AMBASSADOR AND OFFER HIS SUGGESTIONS AS EMANATING FROM US. CHARGE SAID THAT DEPT'S POSITION REMAINS THAT DISPUTE IS BILATERAL MATTER WHICH MUST BE SOLVED BETWEEN TWO GOVTS DIRECTLY INVOLVED. PRIMIN THEN ASKED WHETHER WASHINGTON WOULD BE WILLING TO CALL IN JAPANESE SIMPLY TO SUGGEST THAT USG FEELS THERE THREE VAGUE POINTS IN JAPANESE LETTER WHICH REQUIRE GREATER PRECISION. CHARGE MADE SAME RESPONSE.

6. PRIMIN THEN ASKED WHETHER HE COULD INFORM PRESIDENT THAT USG WORKING ON PROBLEM, WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT US INTERESTS INCLUDING SECURITY, AND THAT USG SHOULD BE GIVEN MORE TIME IN WHICH TO ACCOMPLISH RESULTS. CHARGE INSISTED THAT US ROLE REMAINS LIMITED, BUT THAT PRIMIN WOULD CERTAINLY BE CORRECT IN STATING TO PRESIDENT THAT US IS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER SITUATION, FEELS TWO SIDES ARE REASONABLY CLOSE TO SOLUTION, AND WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING ROK ACTION WHICH WOULD WORSEN SITUATION AND BE DETRIMENTAL TO OUR INTERESTS. PRIMIN SAID HE WOULD TRY ON LATTER BASIS.

7. COMMENT: WE ARE WAITING TO HEAR RESULTS OF THIS AFTERNOON'S MEETING AND PRIMIN'S EFFORTS. ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT WILL MAKE ULTIMATE DECISION AND WE HAVE ONLY INDIRECT INFORMATION REGARDING HIS MOOD, IT INTERESTING THAT AT LEAST PRIMIN WAS WILLING TO WORK FROM JAPANESE DRAFT. HIS SUGGESTED CHANGES, HOWEVER, WOULD ALL COME IN AREAS VERY SENSITIVE TO JAPANESE.

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8. BELIEVE ROKG WILL BE VERY RELUCTANT TO APPROACH JAPANESE AGAIN WITHOUT SOME INDICATION US WILLINGNESS TO LEND SUPPORT TO THEIR EFFORTS. DEPT WILL BE ABLE JUDGE ON BASIS TOKYO'S TRANSLATION OF JAPANESE LETTER WHETHER IT AS VAGUE AS KOREANS INSIST AND WHETHER EFFORT BY USG TO PERSUADE JAPANESE TO STRENGTHEN LANGUAGE IS WARRANTED.

9. CHARGE HAS JUST BEEN CALLED TO SEE VICE FONMIN. WILL REPORT SOONEST.

ERICSON

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## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
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**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 12 SEP 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** kelleyw0  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
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**Subject:** DETERIORATION IN ROK-JAPAN RELATIONS  
**TAGS:** PFOR, KS, JA, (KIM CHONG-PIL)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
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